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Abstract: 
 
In this paper we show that in a two sector economy with heterogeneous agents  and competitive 
markets, in a steady state the optimal capital income tax rate is in general different from zero. The 
optimal tax policy in this setting depends on the relative price difference. In a two sector economy 
capital and labour margins are interdependent, which is why a difference between investment good’s  
price and consumption good’s price allows the government to tax capital income in one sector and 
undo the tax distortion by differential labour income taxation. This policy serves efficiency purpose as 
it restores production efficiency. For instance, if investment goods are more expensive than 
consumption goods, it is optimal to tax capital income in consumption sector, and set zero capital 
income tax and lower labour income tax in investment sector. This policy discourages work and 
investment in consumption sector, and encourages agents to shift capital and working time to 
investment sector. This increases production in investment sector and restores production efficiency. In 
a model with two classes of agents, we show that this policy can also serve redistributive purpose. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
In this paper, we show that in a standard two sector economy with heterogeneous agents, in a 
steady state the optimal capital income tax rate is in general different from zero. In an 
economy where consumption goods and investment goods are two final goods, capital and 
labour margins are interdependent. If there is a difference between the equilibrium price of 
investment goods and equilibrium price of consumption goods, the interdependence of capital 
and labour margins allows the government to choose an optimal policy that taxes/subsidizes 
capital income from one sector and set different rates of labour income taxes across sectors. 
This policy is optimal since the distortions of the capital income tax can be undone by 
differential labour income taxation, and the tax mix restores the production efficiency 
condition. We consider a special form of the general model with two classes of agents: 
workers and capitalists. We show that the optimal policy that taxes/subsidizes capital income 
due to relative price difference can also serve the redistributive purpose. 
 
Our model is a competitive equilibrium version of the standard two sector neoclassical growth 
model with a government that finances an exogenous stream of government purchases, and 
where agents are of different types. We consider two sectors that produce consumption goods  
(consumption sector, hereafter) and investment goods (investment sector, hereafter), using 
raw labour and capital on which government levies distorting flat-rate taxes. The problem is 
to determine the optimal settings over time for two labour income tax rates and two capital 
income tax rates for the two sectors. We characterize this problem as the standard Ramsey 
(1927) problem. We extend the important works of Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), Jones, 
Manuelli and Rossi (1993), Jones et al. (1997) , Judd (1999) and Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe 
(1999) , all of which discuss the optimality of zero capital income tax.  
 
In a one sector neoclassical growth model where one final good is used for consumption and 
investment, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) show that if an equilibrium has an asymptotic 
steady state, then the optimal policy is eventually to set the tax rate on capital income to zero. 
Their key argument is that capital income taxation serves neither efficiency not redistributive 
purpose in the long run. The optimality of the zero capital tax extends also to a one sector 
economy with heterogeneous agents: an idea that was mentioned by Chamley (1986) and an 
analysis that was explored in depth by Judd (1985). Judd (1985) shows that in a one sector 
economy with heterogeneous agents, unanticipated redistributive capital taxation has severely 
limited effectiveness since it depresses wages. His paper argues that if the government only 
values the welfare of workers, since taxing capital in the long run is not optimal, there will not 
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be any redistribution in the limit and government expenditures will be financed solely by 
levying wage taxes on workers. Thus in Judd’s (1985) analysis, capital owners who are 
assumed not to work will be exempt from taxation in the steady state. 
 
Jones et al. (1993) and Jones et al. (1997) show that the optimality of zero capital income tax 
extends to a model with endogenous growth through human capital accumulation. One of 
their main arguments was that since the distortion created by physical capital income tax and 
human capital income tax is compounding in nature, it is a bad idea to tax these income. Judd 
(1999) explores the intuition by showing that in an economy with competitive markets, a long 
run policy that involves a capital income tax creates exponentially growing distortions in 
intertemporal allocations --- something which is inconsistent with the commodity tax 
principle. Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999) summarizes these findings in a paper showing 
that optimality of zero capital income tax is analytically strong even if one relaxes some of 
Chamley’s (1986) assumptions2. They show that this result holds in an economy with 
heterogeneous agents, or in an economy with endogenous growth, or in an open economy, or 
in an economy where the agents live in overlapping generations.  
 
We present a two sector neoclassical model which is possibly one of the simplest extensions 
of Chamley’s (1986) original model. We show that if the equilibrium of a standard two sector 
neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents has an asymptotic steady state, the 
optimal capital income tax rate in investment sector is zero, but the optimal capital income tax 
rate in consumption sector is in general different from zero. We argue that in a two sector 
economy where investment and consumption are produced as two final goods, capital and 
labour margins are interdependent, and so is the optimal policy of taxing income from these 
factors. Due to this interdependence, capital income taxation in our model can serve both 
efficiency and redistributive purposes. We show that in a steady state it is optimal to set zero 
tax on capital income from both sectors if and only if price of investment goods and price of 
consumption goods are equal. The difference in relative price of investment and consumption 
creates a difference in social marginal value of capital in the two sectors, and a tax/subsidy on 
capital income in one sector, leaving the other capital income tax at zero rate can undo this 
difference which in turns serves the efficiency purpose. The distortion created by this capital 
income tax can be undone by setting different rates of labour income taxes across sectors.  
 
For instance, in a steady state if investment goods are cheaper than consumption goods, there 
will be over accumulation of capital which in turns make return to capital very low. We argue 
                                                 
2 Chari and Kehoe (1999), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, ch. 12), and Erosa and Gervais (2001) also present 
comprehensive coverage of these models and the discussion on the optimality of zero capital income tax.  
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that in this case the optimal policy should  subsidize capital income from consumption sector, 
and set higher labour income tax and zero capital income tax in investment sector. This policy 
is optimal because a capital subsidy and a lower labour income tax in consumption sector 
encourages more capital and working time in consumption sector and higher production of 
consumption goods , which in turns undoes the relative price difference. On the contrary, in a 
steady state if consumption goods are cheaper than investment goods, the optimal policy 
should encourage production of investment goods, for which the optimal policy should tax 
capital income in consumption sector, and set lower labour income tax and zero capital 
income tax in investment sector. 
 
Our main result (optimality of nonzero capital income tax) was primarily hinted by Atkeson 
et al. (1999) in an analysis of optimal taxation in a one sector economy with heterogeneous 
agents. Atkeson et al. (1999) impose additional restrictions on the optimal taxation problem in 
order to restrict tax rates on capital income and tax rates on labour income to be same across 
all types of agents. These restrictions are (1) in the Ramsey equilibrium, intertemporal 
marginal rate of substitution of consumption across all agent types must be equal, and (2) the 
ratio of intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour across 
types of agents is equal to the ratio of marginal product of labour across types of agents. Their 
paper argues that in a competitive economy with heterogeneous agents, zero capital income 
taxation in the steady state is optimal if these extra constraints (in particular, 2) do not depend 
on the capital stock. According to their analysis, if capital and labour income taxes are same 
for all types of agents, in a steady state zero rate of capital income tax is optimal if the 
production function is separable between capital and labour. The intuition behind our main 
result stems from the interdependence of the capital and labour margins, which in turns 
presumes that the production functions are not separable in capital and labour. 
 
In a model with workers and capitalists, we show that the optimal policy with nonzero capital 
income tax in consumption sector and differential labour income taxation can serve the 
redistributive purpose. We show that in such an economy where the workers are exogenously 
constrained to not hold any assets and the capitalists are exogenously constrained not to work, 
even if the government cares only about the welfare of workers, there may be redistribution in 
the limit, and capitalists may have to bear part of the burden of the tax. This result extends 
Judd’s (1985) finding that a capital income tax in the long run does not serve redistributive 
purpose. 
 
 
 
 5 
 
2. A Decentralized Economy with Heterogeneous Agents. 
 
Time is discrete and runs forever. The economy has two production sectors indexed by 
},{ XCj Î , where C  and X  denote the consumption sector and investment sector, 
respectively. All markets are perfectly competitive. There is a finite (integer) number of 
different classes of agents, N , and each class is of same size.  The consumption, labour 
supply and capital stock of the representative agent in class NÎi  are denoted by ijt
i
t nc ,  and 
i
jtk , respectively. Class i ’s utility function is ),,(
i
xt
i
ct
i
t
i nncu , but the discount factor 
),( 10Îb  is identical across all agents. The utility function is strictly increasing in 
consumption and decreasing in labour supply, separable in consumption and labour, linear in 
labour and satisfies standard regularity conditions 3. The agents purchase new investment 
goods and rents capital to the firms for one period. Capital decays at the fixed rate ),( 10Îd . 
Firms return the rented capital stock next period net of depreciation, and pay unit cost of 
capital employed, equal to jr . Firms also pay wages, denoted by jw . Agents of type i  are 
each endowed with one unit of time at each period and 00 >
ik  units of capital at period 0 . 
The consumption sector’s technology is: 
 
),( ctct
c
tt nkfgc =+         (1.1) 
 
where tg  is exogenously determined government consumption expenditure, and tc  is the 
level of aggregate private consumption. The investment sector’s technology is: 
 
),( xtxt
x
xtct nkfxx =+        (1.2) 
 
where jx  denotes the level of new investment goods. The technology (.)
jf  satisfies 
standard regularity conditions (including linear homogeneity) and exhibits constant returns to 
                                                 
3 We assume that utility is separable in consumption and labour and linear in labour in order to simply our algebra. 
We will assume the general form of utility function where marginal disutility of work may be different across 
sectors, i.e. working in consumption sector and working in investment sector may have different disliking. We do 
this since it leads us to the more general results. As will be clear from the analysis to follow, our main results are 
not sensitive to these assumptions; i.e. our analysis with this general specification shows that our main results hold 
for a much broader class of utility functions. Later, in a sample case of heterogeneity in our general model, we will 
impose restrictions on the preferences such that the results extend to models with commonly used preferences, e.g. 
utility functions of the form ),( xtctt nncv --1 . 
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scale. We will denote the marginal product of capital, say, in sector j  evaluated at period t  
by )(tf jk . Capital’s law of motion is: 
 
},{;)( XCjkkx jtjtjt Î--= + d11      (1.3) 
 
The government finances the exogenous stream of purchases { }¥=0ttg  solely by linearly taxing 
income from capital and labour employed in both sectors. We will assume that the 
government has access to some commitment device, or a commitment technology that allows 
the government to commit itself once and for all to the sequence of tax rates announced at 
period 0 . The government taxes labour income and capital income at rates jtt  per unit and 
j
tq  per unit, respectively. The government runs a balanced budget each period. The 
government makes non-negative class-specific lump sum transfer 0TR it ³  (but there are no 
lump sum taxes). We also assume that the government has a social welfare function that is 
simply a non-negatively weighted average of individual utilities, with the weight 0³ia  on 
class i , with å
=
=
N
i
i
1
1a . The government’s budget constraints are: 
 
xtxt
x
tctct
c
txtxt
x
tctct
c
ttt krkrnwnwTRg qqtt +++=+     (2) 
 
In (1.1), (1.2), (1.3) and (2), for TRxxkknncz xcxcxc ,,,,,,,= , let å
=
º
N
i
i
tt zz
1
. Competitive 
pricing ensures that factors are paid their marginal revenue product. Optimality in the 
production sectors requires that marginal products are equated with the rental prices of the 
production factors. Defining the relative price of new investment goods as tp , the conditions 
that characterize optimality in the production sectors are 
)(),(),(),( tfpwtfprtfwtfr xntxt
x
ktxt
c
nct
c
kct ==== . The representative agent in class 
NÎi  chooses allocations ¥=++ 011 t
i
xt
i
ct
i
xt
i
ct
i
t kknnc },,,,{  in order to maximize discounted 
lifetime utility subject to the following budget constraints: 
 
i
t
x
t
i
xt
c
t
i
ctt
i
xtxt
x
t
i
ctct
c
t
i
xt
i
ctt
i
t TRRkRkpnwnwkkpc +++-+-=++ ++ ][)1()1(][ 11 tt  
          (3) 
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where )]()([ dq -+-º - 111 jt
j
tt
j
t rpR . Optimality conditions for the agent i ’s problem 
include transversality conditions, (3), and: 
 
ct
c
t
i
c
i
nc wtutu ))(()( t--= 1        (4a) 
xt
x
t
i
c
i
nx wtutu ))(()( t--= 1        (4b) 
)}()){(()( dq
b
-+-+= +++ 111 111 tct
c
t
i
c
t
i
c prtup
tu     (4c) 
)}()){(()( dq
b
-+-+= +++ 111 111 txt
x
t
i
c
t
i
c prtup
tu     (4d) 
 
Given the current model, a feasible allocation is a sequence 
¥
=0ttxtctxtcttxtct gxxnnckk },,,,,,,{  that satisfies equations (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3); a price 
system is a 5-tuple of nonnegative bounded sequences ¥=0ttxtctxtct prrww },,,,{ ; a government 
policy is a 6-tuple of sequences ¥=0ttt
x
t
c
t
x
t
c
t TRg },,,,,{ qqtt . A competitive equilibrium in 
this economy is a feasible allocation, a price system, and a government policy such that (a) 
given the price system and the government policy, the allocation solves both sets of the firms’ 
problems and the agents’ problems, and (b) given the allocation and the price system, the 
government policy satisfies the sequence of government budget constraints (2). The 
competitive equilibrium dynamics in this environment can be characterized by a system of 
equations that include the transversality conditions, optimality conditions in the production 
sectors, (1.1), (1.2), (1.3), (2), and for each agent i , (3), (4a), (4b), (4c) and (4d). 
 
Notice the interdependence of the capital and labour margins in this two sector model. From 
(4a) and (4b), it is straightforward to show that if the competitive equilibrium has a steady 
state,  
 
i
nx
x
n
x
i
nc
c
n
c
uf
uf
p
)(
)(
t
t
-
-
=
1
1
        (4e) 
 
Furthermore, (4c) and (4d) together imply that in a steady state,  
 
x
k
x
c
k
c
f
f
p
)(
)(
q
q
-
-
=
1
1
        (4f) 
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(4e) and (4d) together imply that competitive equilibrium allocations must satisfy: 
 
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
=
--
--
i
nc
i
nx
c
n
x
k
x
n
c
k
cx
xc
u
u
ff
ff
))((
))((
qt
qt
11
11
      (4g) 
 
(4g) implies that due to the interdependence of labour and capital margins, the optimal policy 
for capital income taxation will depend on the optimal policy for labour income taxation. 
 
 
3. The Ramsey Problem. 
 
We use Chamley’s (1986) approach to Ramsey (1927) problem, and derive the conditions that 
characterize the Ramsey allocation. Then we look for the taxes that can implement the 
second-best wedges. Taxes that implement the second best wedges are optimal taxes. In line 
with Chamley (1986), we assume that the government chooses after tax returns to maximize 
welfare such that the chosen after tax returns generate allocations that are implementable in a 
competitive equilibrium. We define after tax returns as 
},{;)(~,)(~ XCjwwrr jt
j
tjtjt
j
tjt Î-º-º tq 11 . We consider (2) and invoke linear 
homogeneity property of the production functions. With the linear homogeneity property, the 
government budget constraint can be expressed only in terms of allocations and after tax 
returns, such as: 
 
xtxtctctxtxtctctxtxt
x
tctct
c
tt nwnwkrkrnkfpnkfTRg
~~~~),(),( ----+=+   (5) 
 
In a model with only one class of agents, given the preset revenue target, the Ramsey problem 
is therefore the government’s problem of choosing the after tax returns that maximizes 
welfare and generates allocations and prices that satisfy the i  invariant equations (5), (4), 
(1.1), (1.2) and (1.3). Since there are many classes of agents, one needs to incorporate the 
agents’ budget constraints as a competitive equilibrium condition that the optimal taxes must 
satisfy. Put differently, the optimal taxes must generate allocations and prices that satisfy 
equilibrium conditions for each class of agents.  
 
Notice that we assume tax rates on capital income and tax rates on labour income do not 
differ across classes of agents. Atkeson et al. (1999) solve a similar problem for a one sector 
economy using the primal approach. The primal approach to optimal taxation, due primarily 
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to Atkinson & Stiglitz (1980, ch. 12), characterizes the set of allocations that can be 
implemented as a competitive equilibrium with distorting taxes by two simple conditions: a 
set of resource constraints and a set of implementability constraints. If one solves the current 
problem using the primal approach and restricts the capital income tax rates and labour 
income tax rates not to vary across classes of agents, in addition to these two constraints, the 
Ramsey problem must include additional constraints: (a) 
)(
)(
)(
)(
11 +
=
+ tu
tu
tu
tu
c
c
i
c
i
c
i
i
; (b) 
)()(
)(
)()(
)(
tftu
tu
tftu
tu
c
nc
nc
c
ni
i
c
i
nc
i
i
i
= ; and (c) 
)()(
)(
)()(
)(
tfptu
tu
tfptu
tu
x
ntc
nx
x
nit
i
c
i
nx
i
i
i
= , i¹i . We recast the 
Ramsey problem using Chamley’s (1986) approach where these constraints are incorporated 
with the detailed equilibrium conditions for all classes of agents4. More precisely, we recast 
the government’s problem as one in which the government chooses allocations to maximize 
welfare subject to (5), (4), (3), (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) for all class i . The problem in 
Lagrangian form is: 
 
å
å
å
å
åå
å
¥
=
=
++
++
=
++
=
==
++
=
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
þ
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ý
ü
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
î
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
í
ì
+---++++
-++-+
-++-+
++++
--+-++
--+
------++
=
0
1
11
11
1
4
11
1
3
1
2
1
1
112
1
1
11
11
1
t
N
i
i
t
i
xtt
i
ctt
i
t
i
xtxt
i
ctct
i
xtxtt
i
ctctt
i
t
txt
i
c
t
i
c
N
i
i
t
tct
i
c
t
i
c
N
i
i
t
xt
i
c
i
nx
N
i
i
tct
i
c
i
nc
N
i
i
t
xtctxtctxtxt
x
t
ttctct
c
t
ttxtxtctctxtxtctctxtxt
x
tctct
c
t
i
xt
i
ct
i
t
i
N
i
i
t
TRkpkpcnwnwkRpkRp
prtu
p
tu
prtu
p
tu
wtutuwtutu
kkkknkf
gcnkf
TRgnwnwkrkrnkfpnkf
nncu
]~~[
)}](~){()([
)}](~){()([
]~)()([]~)()([
]))((),([
]),([
]~~~~),(),([
),,(
Lˆ
e
d
b
m
d
b
m
mm
df
f
y
a
b
 
          (6) 
                                                 
4 In the approach we follow to characterize the optimal taxation problem, we do not require any additional 
restriction on production functions in order to derive our main result. As we will show later, our analysis can 
recover the Chamley-Judd result; but for that we do not require any restrictions on production functions. We can 
work with the general form of neoclassical production function and show that the optimal capital income tax in a 
steady state depends on the relative price difference. The Chamley-Judd result holds only if the relative prices of 
investment and consumption are same. Since our key intuition is based on the interdependence of capital and 
labour margins, we find the hint by Atkeson et al. (1999) relevant. 
 10 
where å
=
º
N
1i
i
tt yy , for TRkknncy xcxc ,,,,,= , and 
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
tttt emmmmffy ,,,,,,, 432121  are 
Lagrange multipliers for (5), (1.1), (1.2&1.3), (4a), (4b), (4c), (4d) and (3), respectively. 
Notice that since in the Ramsey problem the budget constraint and first order conditions of 
each class of agents are included, the social marginal value of an increment in the capital 
stock depends now on whose capital stock is augmented. If in equilibrium all classes behave 
in the same manner, their unilateral actions determine the social marginal value of capital. In 
this section we derive the equilibrium in the general case for all class i . 
 
The Ramsey problem’s first order condition with respect to i 1ctk +  and  
i
1xtk +  are: 
 
)]}(~[)()(]~)([{ dedffybef -++-+++-+=+ +++++++ 1111 1111211112 tct
i
tt
c
ktct
c
ktt
i
tt prtfrtfp
          (7.1) 
)]}(~[)]()([]~)([{ dedfybef -++-+++-+=+ +++++++ 1111 111121112 txt
i
t
x
ktxt
x
kttt
i
tt prtfrtfpp
          (7.2) 
 
and with respect to ictn  and 
i
xtn  are: 
 
)(~)()()( ittct
c
ntt
i
nc
i wtftu eyfya -=++ 1      (7.3) 
)(~)()()( ittxt
x
nttt
i
nx
i wtfptu eyfya -=++ 2      (7.4) 
 
Proposition 1: In a two sector economy with heterogeneous agents, the 
steady state tax rate on capital income from investment sector is zero. 
 
Proof:  The time invariant version of (7.2) , after substituting for  equilibrium factor 
prices, is: 
 
)]()~([)]~([ dfybdbef -++-=-+-+ -- 111 12
1
2 xxxx
i rprrrpp   (8.1) 
 
The time invariant version of (4d) for all class i  is  
 
]~[ db -+= - 11 1 xrp         (8.2) 
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Since optimal taxes generate allocations that satisfy both (8.1) and (8.2), in (8.1) 
011 1 =-+- - )~( db xrp , and thus: 
 
)~()]([ xxx rrrp -=-+-
- bydbf 11 12      (8.3) 
 
(8.2) and (8.3) together imply: 
 
02
1 =+- - ))(~( yfb prr xx        (8.4) 
 
Since 002
1 ¹¹+- byf ,)( p , it must be that Ramsey taxes satisfy 
00 ==- xxx eirr q..,)
~( .       ·  
 
In the current environment, the zero capital income tax policy is optimal for income from 
capital in the investment sector. Notice that Ramsey optimality condition in a steady state , 
(8.3), has a straightforward interpretation. Rewrite (8.3) as: 
 
)]()~([ dfybf -++-= 122
x
kxx frr      (8.5) 
 
 (8.5) states that a marginal increment of capital in investment sector increases the quantity of 
available capital goods by the amount ][ d-+1xkf , which has social marginal value 2f . In 
addition, there is an increase in tax revenues equal to ]~[ xx rr - , which enables the 
government to reduce other taxes by the same amount. Since y  is the shadow price of 
government’s resources, the reduction of this excess burden equals ].~[ xx rr -y  The sum of 
these two effects is discounted by discount factor b , and is equal to the social marginal value 
of capital in investment sector, given by 2f . Since the optimal policy is to set 0=
xq , 
investment in investment sector is consistent with the condition )( db -+= 11 xkf , which 
characterizes the socially optimal allocation of capital. 
 
Proposition 2: In a two sector economy with heterogeneous agents, the 
steady state tax rate on capital income from consumption sector is given by 
 
 12 
i
nx
c
n
ci
nc
x
n
x
i
nx
c
n
c
c
ufuf
uf
)()(
))((
tytf
tfy
q
-+-
-+
=-
11
1
1
2
1  
 
Proof:  The time invariant version of (7.1), after substituting for  equilibrium factor 
prices, is: 
 
)]()~([)]~([ dffybdbef -++-=-+-+ - 111 21
1
2 cccc
i rrrrpp   (9.1) 
 
The time invariant version of (4c) for all class i  is  
 
]~[ db -+= - 11 1 crp         (9.2) 
 
Since optimal taxes generate allocations that satisfy both (9.1) and (9.2), in (9.1) 
011 1 =-+- - )~( db crp , and thus: 
 
])~([)]([ ccc rrr 12 11 fybdbf +-=--      (9.3) 
 
(9.2) and (9.3) together imply: 
 
12
11 fyyfq +=+- - ))(( pc        (9.4) 
 
Since (4a) and (4b) hold for all class i , and since the optimal tax policy generates 
implementable allocations, the optimal tax policy must be consistent with equilibrium price of 
investment goods, which is given by (4e). Invoking the equilibrium price in (9.4) gives 
 
i
nx
c
n
ci
nc
x
n
x
i
nx
c
n
c
c
ufuf
uf
)()(
))((
tytf
tfy
q
-+-
-+
=-
11
1
1
2
1       ·  
 
Proposition 2 says that in a steady state the optimal capital income tax in the consumption 
sector is in general different from zero. This result is one of the main contributions of the 
current paper. Notice that the intuition behind this result can be drawn from the 
interdependence of capital and labour margins in this multi-sector economy. Unlike a one 
sector neoclassical model where the final good is either consumed or invested to augment 
capital stock, in the current economy capital is a good produced in a different sector. This is 
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why equilibrium capital and labour margins are interdependent. Since capital and labour 
margins are interdependent, equilibrium price of investment goods depend on the optimal 
policy of taxing labour income and equilibrium labour margins. Together with the steady state 
versions of the Euler equations (4c) and (4d), it is straightforward to verify that the optimal 
policy of taxing income from capital and labour are also interdependent. 
 
Let us characterize the optimal capital income tax rate in consumption sector which will 
explain why it is nonzero in general, and zero only conditionally. More precisely, we will 
show that the optimal capital income tax policy depends on the relative price of investment 
goods, which in turns depend on the optimal policy for taxing labour income. Due to this 
interdependence, there exists only one equilibrium price of investment goods for which it is 
optimal to tax capital income tax in consumption sector at zero rate. The zero capital income 
tax policy is therefore one of many implementable  optimal policies. To simplify the 
derivations, we impose the restriction inx
i
nc uu =  on preferences, i.e. we assume that the 
marginal disutility from working in two sectors is same. This is common with utility functions 
of the type ),( ixt
i
ct
i
t
i nncuu --= 1 . The equilibrium price of investment goods simplifies to: 
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With (9.5), in a steady state the optimal capital income tax rate in consumption sector is given 
by: 
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Proposition 3: In a two sector economy with heterogeneous agents, the 
steady state tax rate on capital income from consumption sector is zero if and 
only if in equilibrium price of investment goods and price of consumption goods 
are equal. This policy is supported by a labour income tax policy that prescribes 
equal labour income tax rates across sectors. 
 
Proof:  Using (9.5), rewrite (9.6) as: 
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which is same as in (9.4). In this proof we will first show that in a steady state of the Ramsey 
equilibrium, a zero capital income tax policy generates a set of allocations and prices in which 
price of investment goods and price of consumption goods are equal (i.e. 10 =Þ= pcq ). 
Then we show that if in equilibrium price of investment goods and price of consumption 
goods are equal, the optimal policy is to set zero tax on capital income from consumption 
sector (i.e. 01 =Þ= cp q ). 
 
For the first proof, notice that in (9.7), 02
1
1 =Û=
- cp qff . This implies that a zero 
capital income tax in consumption sector is optimal if and only if 2
1
1)( ff
-=p . Thus a zero 
capital income tax in consumption sector is optimal if and only if in equilibrium price of 
investment goods is equal to the ratio of social marginal value of investment goods to social 
marginal value of consumption goods. Rewrite (9.3) as: 
 
)]()~([ dffybf -++-= 1212
c
kcc frr       (9.8) 
 
If in a steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium, the government taxes capital income from 
consumption sector at zero rate, (9.8) together with the condition 2
1
1)( ff
-=p  implies: 
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c
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The zero tax policy is optimal only if the resulting allocations replicate the socially optimal 
allocation of capital in consumption sector, for which )( db -+= 11 ckf  must hold. Together 
with (9.9), this implies that in a steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium if the government sets 
0=cq , it should generate allocations that are consistent with 11
1
2 =
- ff )( , i.e. allocations 
consistent with 1=p . 
 
We now show the converse. Say in equilibrium price of investment goods and price of 
consumption goods are equal, i.e. 1=p . From (9.7), 
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which now defines the optimal capital income tax policy in a steady state. This policy 
generates allocations which are consistent with steady state of both the decentralized 
equilibrium and the Ramsey equilibrium, i.e. this policy must satisfy: 
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(9.11) and (9.12) together imply that the optimal policy implements socially optimal level of 
capital allocation if the optimal policy is consistent with the condition 1
2
1 =
+
+
fy
fy
. The only 
optimal policy that satisfies this condition is to set 0=cq . 
 
If 1=p , consider (7.3) and (7.4) in a steady state, and impose the preference restrictions. 
This gives: 
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From (9.5), (9.13), (9.14), it is straightforward to show that if in equilibrium price of 
investment goods and price of consumption goods are equal, xn
c
n ff = , and thus 
xcc ttq =Û= 0 .        ·  
 
Following proposition 3, if price of investment goods and price of consumption goods are not 
equal in equilibrium, the government can implement an optimal policy that taxes/subsidizes 
capital income in consumption sector and taxes labour income from two sectors at different 
rates in order to undo the capital income tax distortion. Notice that with inx
i
nc uu = , the 
competitive equilibrium condition (4g) is consistent with production efficiency condition if 
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))(())(( cxxc tqtq --=-- 1111 . With proposition 1, if there is no difference in relative 
prices (of consumption and investment), the policy that satisfies production efficiency must 
involve xcc ttq == ,0  (proposition 3). This policy is one of many implementable Ramsey 
policies, which is optimal only if  there is no difference in relative prices. This analysis 
recovers the Chamley-Judd result in the current setting. If that is not the case, the optimal 
policy that serves efficiency purpose includes 
)(
)(
x
c
c
t
t
q
-
-
-=
1
1
1 , with xc tt ¹ . Let us 
consider an example. Say the economy is in a steady state with an inefficiently large 
production of consumption goods and low production of investment goods, such that 
investment goods are more expensive than consumption goods. The (long run) optimal policy 
should encourage production of investment goods by setting a tax on capital income and a 
higher tax on labour income from consumption sector. This policy, supported by a zero 
capital income tax and a lower labour income tax in investment sector, encourages agents to 
shift more capital and working hours to the investment sector, which in turns increases 
investment goods production and minimizes the relative price difference. 
 
The Ramsey equilibrium conditions explain how the distortions of a capital income tax can be 
undone. Consider (9.8), which states that a marginal increment of capital in consumption 
sector increases the quantity of available consumption goods by the amount ckf , which has 
social marginal value 1f . This increment is adjusted by capital depreciation in investment 
sector, which has social marginal value 2f . Thus the aggregate increment in the quantity of 
available consumption goods net of depreciation in social marginal value terms is equal to 
)]([ dff -+ 121
c
kf . The first term is due to an increase in capital in consumption sector, 
while the second terms stands for an indirect increase in production of consumption good 
through increase in depreciated capital in investment sector. This is obvious since in a steady 
state of the Ramsey optimum, the capital income tax in investment sector is zero, and it is 
optimal to keep depreciated capital in investment sector. The increased tax revenue, equal to 
]~[ cc rr - , enables the government to reduce other taxes by the same amount, and the 
reduction of this excess burden equals ]~[ cc rr -y . The sum of these two effects is discounted, 
and is equal to the social marginal value of the available capital.  
 
It is optimal to set zero tax on capital income from consumption sector when social marginal 
value of investment and consumption goods are same, implying in turns that their relative 
prices are same. Any difference in social marginal value of these two is reflected in a relative 
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price difference, which can be undone by the optimal policy that taxes/subsidizes capital 
income in consumption sector and sets differential labour income tax rates. It cannot be 
optimal to set nonzero tax on capital income from investment sector as it removes the shifting 
option. In that sector, a zero capital income tax allows agents to shift depreciated capital to 
that sector along the transition, and avoid compounding capital tax liabilities in consumption 
sector. The optimal capital income tax in consumption sector is thus not zero, in general, and 
the Chamley-Judd result is a special case in this setting. 
 
 
4. The Two Sector Two Class Agents’ Economy. 
 
We now illustrate the case of 2 classes of agents in a two sector model following Judd’s 
(1985) version of heterogeneity. This enables us to examine the redistributive properties of 
the optimal policy when agent classes have distinct exogenous restrictions on investment and 
work. Assume there exist two classes of agents in the model economy, such that },{ 21Îi , 
and each class is of measure one. Agent type 1 are workers who only work and do not save, 
and agent type 2  are capitalists who only save and do not work. We will continue with the 
same set up in production sectors and for the government. We will continue with the notation 
},{;)(~,)(~ XCjwwrr jt
j
tjtjt
j
tjt Î-º-º tq 11 . In addition, in order to simply the algebra, 
we will assume that workers’ utility function is separable in consumption and leisure, linear in 
labour services, and that marginal disutility from working in the two sectors are same. In 
particular, we assume that workers have preferences described by the utility function over 
infinite horizon 
 
å
¥
=
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11111 1
t
xtctt
t nncuU ),(b       (10) 
 
The workers’ budget constraints for all time t  are: 
 
1111
txtxtctctt TRnwnwc ++=
~~        (11) 
 
The representative worker is endowed with one unit of time at each period, and chooses 
consumption and labour supply to maximize (10) subject to (11). The consolidated first order 
conditions, assuming )()()( tututu nnxnc
111 == , include (11) and: 
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The capitalists do not work and only invest by purchasing investment goods and renting 
capital to firms. Each capitalist is endowed with 020 >k  units of capital at period 0 . They 
have preferences described by the utility function over infinite horizon 
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Budget constraint for capitalists for all time t  is: 
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The representative capitalist chooses ¥=++ 0
2
1
2
1
2
txtctt kkc },,{  in order to maximize (13) subject to 
(14). The consolidated first order conditions that characterize their equilibrium behaviour 
include the transversality conditions, (14), and the Euler equation: 
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Since firms’ problems are unchanged, the competitive equilibrium factor prices in this model 
are )(),(),(),( tfpwtfprtfwtfr xntxt
x
ktxt
c
nct
c
kct ==== . The resource constraints are: 
 
02112 =--- tttctct
c gccnkf ),(       (16a) 
01 2 1
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We continue with the assumption that government expenditure is exogenous, and government 
can commit to a plan of tax rates. The government budget constraint for all time t  is: 
 
1122121221
xtxtctctxtxtctctxtxt
x
tctct
c
ttt nwnwkrkrnkfpnkfTRTRg
~~~~),(),( ----+=++  
          (17) 
Given the current model, a feasible allocation is a sequence ¥=0
112122
ttxtctttxtct gnncckk },,,,,,{  
that satisfies equations (16a) and (16b); a price system is a 5-tuple of nonnegative bounded 
 19 
sequences ¥=0ttxtctxtct prrww },,,,{ ; a government policy is a 7-tuple of sequences 
¥
=0
21
tttt
x
t
c
t
x
t
c
t TRTRg },,,,,,{ qqtt . A competitive equilibrium in this economy is a feasible 
allocation, a price system, and a government policy such that (a) given the price system and 
the government policy, the allocation solves both sets of the firms’ problems and the agents’ 
problems, and (b) given the allocation and the price system, the government policy satisfies 
the sequence of government budget constraints (17).   
 
There are many competitive equilibria indexed by different government policies, and this 
multiplicity motivates the Ramsey problem. Assume that the government has a social welfare 
function that is a positively weighted average of individual utilities, with the weight 
},{; 210 Î³ iia , å
=
=
2
1
1
i
ia . The Ramsey problem’s Lagrangian is: 
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The first order condition with respect to 2 1ctk +   is: 
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and with respect to 2 1xtk +  is: 
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and with respect to 1ctn  and 
1
xtn  are: 
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The conditions (19.1), (19.2), (19.3) and (19.4) are symmetric to conditions (7.1) , (7.2), (7.3) 
and (7.4), respectively. Furthermore, symmetry of (4a), (4b) from the general model (given 
the preference restriction), and (12) from the current model, and symmetry of (4c), (4d) from 
the general model and (15) from the current model imply that the current set up is also 
covered by the preceding analysis of optimal taxation in a steady state. In this set up, 
therefore, proposition 1, 2, and 3 hold; i.e. if there is a steady state, optimal capital income tax 
rate in investment sector is zero, and optimal capital income tax rate in consumption sector is 
in general different from zero. 
 
We now discuss the redistributive properties of this optimal policy under the current setting. 
We will only focus on redistribution in a limiting steady state, and will not discuss about how 
much redistribution is accomplished in the transition period. We first consider the special case 
that extends Chamley-Judd result in our setting. In deciding the optimal policy, 2a  plays no 
role, and thus we can conduct this analysis from the point of view where government cares 
only about workers’ welfare, i.e. 021 => aa . If investment good’s price and consumption 
good’s price are same in equilibrium, optimal capital income tax rate is zero. With this policy, 
the government collects all revenue to finance its purchases by levying labour income taxes. 
Even if the government cares only about the workers’ welfare, there will not be any 
redistribution in the limit. This result extends one of Judd’s (1985) main results to the current 
setting. 
 
If investment goods are more expensive than consumption goods, say, it is optimal to tax 
capital income and set higher labour income tax in consumption sector. With this policy, the 
government collects revenue from three tax instruments, and both workers and capitalists bear 
the burden of taxes. This happens even if the government cares only about the workers’ 
welfare. With this policy, there is redistribution in the limit. We therefore show that a capital 
income tax can serve efficiency as well as redistributive purposes. If investment goods are 
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cheaper than consumption goods, say, it is optimal to subsidize capital income in 
consumption sector, which is accomplished by levying taxes on labour income. The revenue 
collected from labour income taxation will be used for both government purchases and capital 
subsidy. Since we assume there is no lump sum tax, the optimal policy involves some 
redistribution in the limit in the form of capital subsidy. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks. 
 
We examine optimal income taxation in a two sector economy with heterogeneous agents. 
We contribute by showing that in such an economy, if the competitive equilibrium has a 
steady state, the optimal capital income tax rate in consumption sector is in general different 
from zero. This result can be extended to a more general result if one replaces the sector-
specific income taxes with one capital income tax rate and one labour income tax rate which 
are applied to capital income and labour income from both sectors (the average effective tax 
rates on capital income and labour income). This simplification assists in smoother algebra 
and the optimal policy, given such a tax code, is similar to what we have found. This tax 
code, however does not explain the characteristics of a tax mix. Our analysis shows that if 
there is a difference between equilibrium prices of investment and consumption, the optimal 
policy is to set zero tax on capital income from investment sector, a tax/subsidy on capital 
income from consumption sector, and different rates of labour income taxes across sectors. 
Our tax code thus assists in explaining how the shifting occurs. In the model with workers and 
capitalists, we show that our tax code explains the redistributive property of the optimal 
policy. 
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